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Summary
Livestock production systems and the societies in which they are embedded face 
a set of risks presented by infectious diseases and natural and human-made 
disasters which compromise animal health. Within this set, threats are posed 
by natural, deliberate and accidental actions that can cause sudden changes in 
animal health status, requiring the allocation of additional resources to manage 
animal health. Determining the benefit of preparing for such emergencies is 
a challenge when the total set of risks includes the unknown. Any method for 
analysing the economic costs and benefits of animal health emergencies must not 
only accommodate this uncertainty, but make it a central feature of the analysis. 
Cost–benefit analysis is a key approach to economically evaluating animal health 
interventions. However, the value of this approach in dealing with uncertainty 
is often called into question. This paper makes the case that, by restricting the 
outcomes of an emergency event to specified states of nature, boundaries can be 
placed on the uncertainty space, allowing cost–benefit analysis to be performed. 
This method, which merges state-contingent analysis with cost–benefit analysis, 
is presented here. Further discussion on the economic characteristics of 
emergency events, and the nature of the threats posed to animal health systems, 
is also provided. 
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Introduction
In the wake of the Al-Qaeda attack on the United States of 
America (USA) on 11 September 2001, the risk of biological 
agents being used for terrorist purposes was identified as 
a present and credible threat to the public. Agroterrorism 
is defined as a deliberate attack on agriculture that may 
include the deliberate release of pathogens into animal 
or plant populations, with the objective of destroying 
agriculture and disrupting food supplies. While deemed 
to be a low-probability event, the potential impacts may 
be significant. Consequently, governments have sought to 
identify high-risk pathogens and to review their investment 
in risk mitigation and emergency preparation measures (1). 
Agroterrorism is just one of a series of natural or human-
made animal health events that may require an emergency 
response. Agroterrorism is considered a low-probability 
and high-impact event since, while a single act may cause 
devastating outcomes, it may equally never take place. 
These events pose complex problems for evaluation, making 
it difficult to justify investment into preparation to combat 
or prevent such outcomes.
This paper will explore the conceptual basis for evaluating 
investment into preparing for high-impact, low-probability 
events. To do this, we must not only be able to separate 
the costs and benefits from alternative investments, as well 
as deal with risk and uncertainty, but also separate fear 
from logic to help us make rational decisions. There is no 
guarantee that unlimited funding will prevent every future 
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incident of agroterrorism. Equally, there is no guarantee 
that a single agroterrorist incident will ever occur. Based 
on experience, however, it can be guaranteed that there 
will be a significant emergency (natural or human-made) 
response needed from animal health services somewhere in 
the world, sooner rather than later.
Thus, it is necessary to define what constitutes an emergency 
in the context of animal health. If we consider the set of 
all pests (diseases, weeds, vertebrate pests, pathogens, 
etc.) that may affect a given production system in a given 
location at a given time, we can define the ‘background 
pest load’ (2). This background pest load then defines the 
endemic pests that shape production system investments. 
We can define the frequency (i.e. how often they occur), 
the management approach (i.e. the costs used to control 
the pest) and the outcome of that management (i.e. yield 
and price). The background pest load identifies the known 
risk and determines the returns from alternative livestock 
production systems. 
The risk posed by pests is not static over time. Changes 
in climate, land use and trade patterns can introduce new 
pathogens or induce changes in the background pest load 
(3, 4). Such changes can be gradual or sudden, deliberate 
or accidental, and have the potential to alter the rate of 
return from existing livestock production systems. An 
animal health emergency occurs when a sudden change 
in the background pest load necessitates the allocation 
of additional resources to protect capital investment in 
livestock production.
For this paper, the authors define:
– animal health management (AHM) as the impact of the 
background pest load in an area in a given time period 
– emergency animal health management (EAHM) as 
the impact of a sudden shock to the background pest 
load, causing additional private or public resources to be 
allocated to protect existing capital investment in livestock 
production. 
We can then consider the difference between AHM and 
EAHM as the difference between the management of 
known risks to production choices, and the management 
of unknown risks or uncertainties that production systems 
may face. For this article, the authors limit the discussion to 
EAHM resulting from one of the following:
–  a natural event, such as the natural movement of a 
disease or vector
– an accidental event, such as the introduction of disease 
through trade in livestock or livestock products
– a deliberate event, such as an agroterrorist attack or act of 
commercial sabotage. 
To begin assessing the economic value of emergency 
preparedness, it is necessary to quantify the costs of 
preparing for emergencies, and the economic impact of 
livestock disease. The impact of disease is likely to be shown 
as a combination of direct costs, that is, the effects of the 
disease itself, and the response costs incurred in reaction 
to it (Fig. 1). These costs will not necessarily be limited to 
the livestock sector or consumers of livestock products, 
Fig. 1
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but can reach into other sectors of the economy, such as 
tourism, leisure and human healthcare. The economic 
case for preparedness hinges on whether the magnitude of 
these impacts in the future can be reduced by investing in 
Veterinary Services in the present. 
Investing in emergency 
preparedness
Emergency preparedness and response are public goods. 
Public goods are those goods and services which benefit 
everyone, in that those who do not pay cannot be excluded 
from using them or benefiting from their provision. As 
a result, markets do not provide incentives for private 
institutions to supply public goods at the level needed for 
society to operate at its optimum level. Public goods are 
therefore funded by government institutions and some 
benevolent non-governmental agencies to improve public 
welfare. 
Governments allocate resources to manage both the existing 
background pest load (AHM) and new risks (EAHM). 
Emergency animal health management funding may take 
various forms: reducing the risk of an outbreak occurring 
(e.g. monitoring), or reducing the severity of an outbreak 
(e.g. research and development, and having resources ready 
to combat the first signs of an outbreak). With limited public 
budgets, the quantity of resources allocated to AHM and 
EAHM needs to be justified. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is 
a process of evaluating the returns from allocating economic 
inputs (land, labour and capital) into different investment 
options over time. It permits the incorporation of risk and 
uncertainty into evaluation. In this paper, the authors will 
explore the application of CBA to emergency preparedness 
in animal health. State-contingent analysis (SCA) will be 
presented as a way of conceptualising the uncertainty related 
to the diversity of potential changes in the background pest 
load. Although CBA can be undertaken from an individual 
(private) or institutional (public) perspective, this paper 
will limit the discussion to institutions. 
Examining the costs and benefits of EAHM from an 
institutional perspective requires us to explore a number of 
questions, including:
1. What are the costs of emergency preparedness?
2. What is the potential impact of an animal health 
emergency?
These questions each present challenges to empirical 
analysis. First, examining the costs of emergency 
preparedness requires an assessment of Veterinary Services 
budgets and identification of those activities relevant to 
EAHM. Within those budgets, fixed-cost investments are 
often multi-purpose, such as salaried staff and infrastructure. 
While these can be diverted in case of an animal health 
emergency, the opportunity cost of this investment is only 
captured by evaluations after the event, and these are not 
often performed. 
Second, Veterinary Services themselves are often subsumed 
within a larger Ministry, such as the Ministry of Agriculture 
or Food, and compete for funding with other executive 
agencies. As a result, forecast expenditure does not 
always translate to actual expenditure, as resources may 
be reallocated to other departments in the budget period. 
Funds may be misappropriated, or accidentally allocated 
against different accounting line items, and the costs of 
animal health services may also be supported by donor aid 
or other non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, 
effective emergency plans may require the coordination 
of other Ministries, such as Health and Security, which 
would not be visible by examining only Veterinary Services 
budgets. In summary, significant uncertainty is present 
when trying to assess current spending on emergency 
preparedness. 
Third, in order to understand the potential benefits of 
emergency preparedness, it is also necessary to identify 
a range of potential impacts that can be mitigated by 
an effective response. If we begin with the category of 
pathogens, various classification systems developed by 
national and international institutions provide listings 
of candidate organisms with the potential to cause an 
animal health emergency. Dual-use biological agents are 
those which are considered to exist naturally but which 
also have potential application as a biological weapon 
(e.g. anthrax). Examining the dual-use listings of the USA 
(7), the People’s Republic of China (8), and the Australia 
Group of countries (9) produces a list of 83 agents. Of these, 
40 have a direct impact on livestock (including horses) and 
more than half are zoonotic (Table I). As can clearly be seen, 
these pathogens are highly variable in their taxonomy, host 
specificity, virulence, zoonotic potential, pathology and 
transmission modes, and therefore also in their potential 
impact.
Fourth, in addition to the broad group of organisms that 
make up the set of known threats, there is also the possibility 
of new and emerging pathogens, which pose an unknown 
set of threats. Calculating the impact of the unknown relies 
on making assumptions, each parcelled with an additional 
degree of uncertainty.
In recent years, changes in land use are thought to have driven 
the emergence of a number of newly identified viral zoonotic 
pathogens, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome-
associated coronaviruses (SARS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2), 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), 
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and the Nipah and Hendra viruses (10). Changes in climate 
can introduce existing pathogens and vectors into new 
geographical ranges, as happened with the Chikungunya 
and West Nile viruses (11), while human actions can 
accidentally produce the same result, as happened with the 
introduction of African swine fever to the Caucasus in 2007 
(12). In addition, antigenic drift and shift, horizontal gene 
transfer, and the application of selective pressures, such as 
antibiotic therapies, can produce new variants of existing 
pathogens, such as the H5N1 strain of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (13), and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (14). As in the case of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), there is always the potential for 
human actions to produce consequences which are totally 
unanticipated (15), while deliberate manipulation of 
pathogens to create new variants is becoming increasingly 
possible with the advent of technologies such as clustered 
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-
associated protein 9 (Cas9) genetic editing (16). The release 
or manufacture of weapons based on pathogens which have 
been previously eradicated is also acknowledged to be a real 
threat (17). 
The interplay of all these factors makes identifying the 
entire set of animal health emergencies that may occur 
an impossibility. What can be done, however, is to 
explore the literature to determine a set of emergencies 
for which economic impact analysis has been performed, 
thus determining a range within which future events are 
likely to occur, while still acknowledging a certain level of 
uncertainty. 
The literature on the economic impact of animal health 
emergencies in itself presents challenges to meta-analysis. 
Any economic analysis has four key issues to consider (18) 
and animal health emergencies are no different.
1.  What is the scale of the analysis?
The scale defines the institutional level at which the animal 
health event is managed. Should the impact be analysed at 
a farm level, a local level, a regional level, an industry level, 
a national level or an international level?
2. What is the scope of the analysis?
The scope refers to the number of different issues that 
the analysis should consider. In the case of animal health 
emergencies, should the analysis consider certain groups 
(e.g. farmers, export markets, etc.) where market values 
are easily found? Or should the analysis also include 
those goods and services for which non-market analysis is 
required (e.g. environmental impact, the effects on animal 
welfare, etc.)?
3. What is the timing of the analysis?
Economic analysis can be performed before events occur, 
to assist in allocating resources to prepare for animal health 
emergencies and to establish essential metrics to monitor 
the situation. At the beginning of the event, economic 
metrics can be used to assess whether an emergency 
response is warranted. Review points during the event can 
be used to determine whether the emergency event has 
progressed to a stage where it changes from an emergency 
response to an eradication or management phase. After 
the event, reviews of its economic impact can be used to 
identify improvements for the future. Determining at which 
point published analyses have been performed is therefore 
a necessary part of any meta-analysis. 
Is the analysis being conducted before the event 
(e.g. to invest in funds to have resources ready to combat 
any future adverse event) or at the beginning of the event 
(e.g. does the event meet the metrics required to initiate an 
emergency response)? Does it take place at a review point 
during the event (e.g. has the emergency event progressed 
to a stage where it changes from an emergency response 
Table I
Pathogens identified as biological warfare or bioterrorist threats 
to livestock or horse populations, including zoonotic pathogens
Affecting livestock or horses
Affecting livestock or horses,  
and humans
African horse sickness virus Avian influenza virus
African swine fever virus Bacillus anthracis
Bluetongue virus Brucella abortus
Classical swine fever virus Brucella melitensis
Foot and mouth disease virus Brucella suis
Goat pox virus Burkholderia mallei
Lumpy skin disease virus Burkholderia pseudomallei
Mycoplasma capricolum Chlamydia psittaci
Mycoplasma mycoides Clostridium botulinum
Peste des petits ruminants virus Coxiella burnetti
Swine vesicular disease virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus
Rinderpest virus Francisella tularensis
Sheep pox virus Hendra virus
Suid herpesvirus 1 (Aujeszky’s disease 
or pseudorabies)
Japanese encephalitis virus
Swine vesicular disease virus Louping ill virus
Teschen disease virus Lyssavirus
Murray Valley encephalitis virus
Newcastle disease virus
Nipah virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
Vesicular stomatitis virus
Western equine encephalitis virus
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis
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to an eradication or management phase) or after the event 
(e.g. to determine improvements for the future)? 
4. What is the space over which the analysis will occur?
The space is the geographical range encompassed by the 
analysis. When evaluating an EAHM, this can combine both 
the area in which the outbreak occurs, and the area which feels 
the economic impact. Collaboration with epidemiologists is 
therefore important for exploring spatial spread.
Within the domain of animal health economics, there 
is no agreed position on these four axes that is applied 
in all studies of disease impact. This issue was identified 
by Pritchett et al. (19) in 2005, and ten years later by 
Inamura et al. (20), indicating that progress has been 
slow in forming a consensus on how economic analyses 
of livestock disease emergencies should be carried out. 
The result is that there are relatively few studies which 
are sufficiently methodologically consistent to allow meta-
analysis of all dimensions of economic impact. However, 
the commencement of the Global Burden of Animal 
Diseases project may herald the beginning of harmonised 
data collection and analysis processes across the animal 
health sector (21). 
Cost–benefit analysis and 
dealing with uncertainty
Cost–benefit analysis provides a helpful framework for 
analysing the known costs and benefits of alternative 
investments. It typically models economic outcomes based 
on scenarios ‘with’ and ‘without’ the intervention in question. 
However, the role of CBA in dealing with uncertain future 
events has been questioned in the literature, for several 
reasons. 
The first is that CBA relies on converting future costs and 
benefits to present values. However, the selection of an 
appropriate method for determining values (using market 
versus non-market techniques) and the appropriate time 
scale for estimating this for emergency events can be 
debated. Second, where events may or may not occur, this 
probability assessment must be reflected in the valuation 
process. Finally, CBA relies on the comparison of clearly 
defined scenarios, and has thus been criticised as being 
unable to represent the unknown (22). 
Discount rates provide a mechanism to bring all future 
benefits and costs back to a given year to compare between 
investment options. The further the benefits occur in the 
future and the higher the discount rate, the greater the bias 
against future returns. In the case of public goods, it is argued 
that a low discount rate is most appropriate, so it follows that 
a very low-to-zero discount rate is needed when considering 
investment in EAHM (23, 24, 25). Where funding is targeted 
to prevent a catastrophic event that will harm society (26), a 
low discount rate is suitable to protect social welfare.
It is hoped that the discussion to this point has illustrated 
the level of uncertainty present in any evaluation of 
emergency preparedness, partly because emergencies by 
their very nature are unpredictable, and partly because of 
the inconsistent collection of the relevant data to inform 
assumptions. While evaluation, monitoring and research 
may identify and detect known risks, it is the unknown 
issues that pose the true complication for emergency 
response. For known risks, a level of risk can be calculated, 
the critical entry points identified, and management 
responses that reduce the risk and provide the greatest net 
welfare benefit to society can be devised (27). While these 
forecasts may be imperfect, they can be upgraded over 
time, adding greater clarity to what is known. It is those 
things that take us by surprise, however, that can create the 
greatest strain on emergency response networks, and on the 
methodology used to analyse investment. To integrate this 
response to uncertainty into the model, the authors turn 
to the approach suggested by Adamson and Loch (22), 
which merges SCA into CBA. This method resolves both 
the second and third points of objection above, and the 
following section will articulate precisely how SCA provides 
a platform to model risk and uncertainty. 
State-contingent analysis 
In the SCA approach, nature (Ω) defines the complete 
uncertainty space, which can be divided into a series of real 
and mutually exclusive states of nature (s), so that (Ω = [1, 
2, …, S]) (28). In the case of an animal health emergency, 
s refers to the emergency state (i.e. no emergency, a small 
emergency, a large emergency), in which each emergency 
is characterised by its scale, scope, time and space. These 
characteristics should also describe the management 
approach and the outcomes from that approach for each s. 
The decision-maker has no ability to influence which s 
occurs, but does have a subjective understanding of the 
probability (π) of each s occurring. For a CBA, the ‘with’ 
versus ‘without’ intervention scenarios have a different 
probability of each s occurring, but the description, 
management solution and outcomes for each s remain 
constant. The decision-maker then knows exactly how to 
allocate his or her resources to mitigate risk in the event of 
each s. The SCA approach then removes the ambiguity (29) 
found in other approaches for dealing with uncertainty, 
as both the signal of uncertainty and the response to that 
uncertainty can now be evaluated (30). 
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State-contingent analysis thus helps decision-makers 
to prepare for alternative states of nature. When new 
information becomes available, the decision-makers can 
update their estimation of frequency for each state of nature, 
and reallocate their resources appropriately. This capability 
can be shown by directly exploring rare states of nature 
(those that have a low probability but severe consequences) 
through a simple graphical analysis of a typical mean-
variance model.
In Figure 2, a normal distribution truncated at zero is 
plotted, which provides a representation of outcomes of a 
disease event from 0 (no impact) all the way to total loss 
(X). At the first statistical division (σ), 68% of all values are 
encapsulated; at 2σ, 95.5% of all values are encompassed; 
and by 3σ, 99.7% of all values are captured. However, 
this representation provides no information on how 
management interventions should be adapted in response.
In Figure 3, EAHM is represented within an SCA framework 
by dividing uncertainty into states of nature (i.e. no 
emergency, a small emergency, a medium emergency, and a 
large emergency). In this case, the decision-maker can now 
define what the emergency would represent in each state; 
its range of impacts based on scale, scope, timing and space; 
the set of management responses to each state of nature; and 
the frequency of occurrence. This allows the exploration of 
those rare events making up the tail of the distribution. In 
a CBA framework, the sensitivity of the system to each state 
of nature can be explored, and the management solutions 
that fail to protect capital can be determined. Changes in 
policy or increased threats can then easily be represented, 
either by re-describing the states of nature, their inputs and 
outputs, or by changing their frequency. As the model solves 
each re-described state of nature or change in frequency, 
the decision-maker can determine new optimal solutions, 
mimicking adaptation. 
In examining the economic impact of animal health 
emergencies, this paper has focused on describing events 
in terms of their scale, scope, timing and space. It is these 
four dimensions that determine the economic impact of an 
animal health emergency on society. The essential aspect of 
evaluating investment in emergency preparedness will be to 
develop a realistic ‘story’ that defines the differences in scale, 
scope, time and space between the ‘with’ versus ‘without’ 
investment narrative that is central to the cost−benefit 
analysis. The alternative ‘with’ and ‘without’ narratives 
define the changes in decision-making and in the resources 
used in dealing with a problem. 
Discussion
As SCA allows us to define states of nature and the response 
to those states of nature with certainty, ambiguity is 
removed. However, as the authors discuss above, EAHM 
remains fraught with uncertainty. This methodology allows 
restrictions to be drawn around the range of possible 
outcomes. However, the reality is that, during an actual 
event, the unpredicted can still occur. While some disease 
emergence and agroterrorism pathways can be described, 
the future is unwritten and new risks will inevitably emerge. 
It will be up to the individuals responsible for minimising 
harm to stay vigilant, maintain and improve response 
capacity, and be ready to deal with such emergencies.
In this respect, the set of possible agroterrorism or deliberate 
pathogen-release events is a relatively unexplored space. 
What is the objective of a deliberate act to create an 
emergency animal health event? Intriligator (31) treats 
terrorism and counter-terrorist agents as utility maximisers 
(i.e. those who seek to get the highest satisfaction from their 
economic decisions). But this goal of maximising utility is 
false for terrorism. In reality, terrorists can be considered 
Fig. 3
State-contingent analysis representation of probability of 
alternative events occurring
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utility satisfiers; in that a ‘good enough’ rather than a ‘perfect’ 
outcome is acceptable (32). There will always be a trade-
off between media exposure and damage created from a 
deliberate act, so that any action (successful or otherwise) 
will have a high pay-off in CBA terms. Any deliberate 
release of a biological agent, even in a non-vital part of 
the supply chain, is likely not only to create fear, but also 
to gain widespread media attention. In turn, this attention 
may inspire other non-affiliated and unknown ‘lone wolves’ 
to act (33). For example, sending anthrax by mail (34) may 
not result in casualties, but the fear generated may provide a 
satisfactory outcome. If a critical part of the supply chain is 
compromised, then the impact would certainly overlap with 
the set of known events, leading to a reallocation of resources 
(35) and market share (36), reducing consumer trust for that 
product (37), and shattering known value chains (38, 39). 
Taking appropriate action at the appropriate time can 
prevent local emergency events from spreading to a 
regional, national or international scale. Expertise and 
familiarity with local conditions can help decision-makers 
to identify risk creators and minimise transmission along 
the animal value chain, as well as contact points for human 
exposure to zoonotic pathogens. These features emphasise 
the importance of treating emergency preparedness as 
a system, and seeing investment in human capital as an 
essential component of emergency response, a component 
that complements capital investment in contingency plans, 
infrastructure or systems. Central to the implementation of 
any contingency plan or emergency response, therefore, are 
the people implementing that plan; their skills are key to 
any successful intervention. In addition, the relationships 
necessary for a multisectoral response from Veterinary 
Services, law enforcement, human health services and 
others should be strengthened in ‘peace time’ (i.e. when 
no emergency is occurring) to facilitate a swift and effective 
reaction when necessary. 
One real advantage of investing in preparedness for EAHM is 
that it takes less time to deploy resources when an emergency 
occurs, limiting its economic impact. It is important 
to remember that this investment is complementary to 
preventative measures, such as quarantine and border 
inspections, which reduce the probability of an emergency 
event occurring in the first place. The portfolio of emergency 
preparedness measures, however, should include measures 
that specialise in the known threats, such as disease-
specific contingency plans, as well as those that increase 
cross-cutting competencies, such as laboratory diagnostic 
capacity and passive surveillance systems. These cross-
cutting competencies are likely to be used when facing both 
known and unknown threats.
In this regard, the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway 
(40) provides a route by which Veterinary Services are able 
to identify areas of strength and weakness, and examine 
resource allocations for both cross-cutting competencies 
and specific responses. This enables governments to target 
and monitor capacity-building activities for emergency 
preparedness in Veterinary Services. Competencies related 
to disease emergencies may also be valuable in other types 
of emergency, such as natural disasters, and this should be 
considered in any future analysis.
Funding is just one piece of the puzzle, and care is needed 
when dealing with institutional frameworks, which require 
both careful design in their development and rigour in 
carrying out their allotted duties. When institutions must 
multitask, the incentives offered for each task must be equal, 
otherwise the institution will primarily allocate resources to 
the activity with the greatest return (41). In countries where 
institutions and regulations are lax, no injection of funding 
for a specific goal will fix the underlying institutional 
weaknesses, nor will it provide a sustainable solution to the 
problem.
Funding to prepare for animal health emergencies and 
agroterrorism events faces diminishing marginal returns. It 
is true that the risk of agroterrorism decreases as funding 
increases (42), but it is impossible to guarantee sufficient 
funds to develop a perfectly safe system. There will always 
be some level of risk that society must face. If an event 
does occur, inevitably a lack of funding will be blamed, 
especially if it leads to loss of life. It is the responsibility 
of governments, briefed with the most up-to-date analyses, 
to determine the level of acceptable risk to be passed on to 
society. State-contingent analysis brings advantages when it 
comes to bridging the gap between the scientific and policy-
making communities. By exploring different metrics of 
impact, such as disability-adjusted life year cost, jobs lost, 
or animals culled, acceptable risk thresholds can be set for 
different emergency preparedness strategies.
Conclusions
Risk and uncertainty lie at the heart of agroterrorism and 
animal health emergency preparedness. A set of tools exists 
with which it is possible to articulate the risks and explore 
the uncertainties. The role of economic analysis, in this 
case, is to explore the uncertainty space, provide guidance, 
and help decision-makers to reach a conclusion by 
articulating the advantages and disadvantages of investment 
in emergency preparedness. Assessing an acceptable level of 
risk is not a purely economic problem, and deciding how 
emergency funding is apportioned is the responsibility of 
governments. It is their perception of risk, and the level of 
risk they are willing to pass on to society, that will determine 
funding and the manner in which it is allocated.
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Preparación para casos de emergencia zoosanitaria: 
consideraciones relativas a la evaluación económica 
D. Adamson, W. Gilbert, K. Hamilton, D. Donachie & J. Rushton 
Resumen
Los sistemas de producción pecuaria y las sociedades en las que están inscritos 
afrontan una serie de riesgos derivados de enfermedades infecciosas y de 
desastres de origen natural y humano que ponen en peligro la sanidad animal. 
Dentro de esta panoplia de riesgos están las amenazas derivadas de sucesos 
naturales o actos deliberados o accidentales que puedan inducir un cambio 
repentino de la situación zoosanitaria y exigir recursos adicionales para 
gestionarla. La determinación de los beneficios que pueda traer consigo la 
preparación para tales emergencias no es tarea fácil, cuando «lo desconocido» 
forma parte del conjunto de riesgos que se afrontan. Todo método encaminado 
a analizar los costos económicos y eventuales beneficios en el ámbito de las 
La préparation aux urgences zoosanitaires : les éléments à prendre 
en compte pour une évaluation économique
D. Adamson, W. Gilbert, K. Hamilton, D. Donachie & J. Rushton 
Résumé
Les systèmes de production animale et les sociétés dans lesquelles ils s’inscrivent 
doivent faire face à une série de risques associés à des maladies infectieuses 
ou à des catastrophes d’origine naturelle ou anthropique, qui représentent une 
menace pour la santé animale. Parmi ces risques, certaines menaces résultant 
d’actions naturelles, délibérées ou accidentelles peuvent modifier de manière 
drastique la situation sanitaire des cheptels et imposer d’allouer des ressources 
supplémentaires à la gestion de la santé animale. Il est difficile de déterminer à 
l’avance les bénéfices apportés par la préparation aux urgences dès lors que 
la série complète des risques à envisager comporte des éléments inconnus. 
Les méthodes d’analyse des coûts et des bénéfices économiques appliquées 
aux urgences de santé animale doivent non seulement tenir compte de cette 
incertitude, mais la placer au cœur de l’analyse. 
L’analyse coûts-bénéfices est une méthode clé pour évaluer les interventions 
de santé animale dans une perspective économique. Néanmoins, la capacité 
de cette méthode à traiter l’incertitude est souvent mise en cause. Les auteurs 
soutiennent qu’en limitant l’analyse des répercussions d’une situation d’urgence 
à certains états spécifiques de la nature, il devient possible de poser des bornes à 
l’étendue de l’incertitude, ce qui permet de réaliser une analyse couts-bénéfices. 
Ils présentent cette méthode, qui consiste à combiner l’analyse des incertitudes 
dépendantes d’un état de choses donné (state-contingent analysis), avec une 
analyse coûts-bénéfices. Ils examinent ensuite les caractéristiques économiques 
des situations d’urgence ainsi que la nature des menaces que ces dernières font 
peser sur les systèmes de santé animale.  
Mots-clés
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emergencias zoosanitarias debe no solo integrar esta incertidumbre, sino hacer 
de ella el elemento central del análisis. 
El análisis de la relación costo-beneficio es un procedimiento clave para evaluar 
económicamente las intervenciones de sanidad animal, aunque a menudo se 
cuestiona su utilidad o idoneidad para manejar la incertidumbre. Los autores 
postulan que, restringiendo los resultados de un suceso de emergencia a un 
conjunto especificado de estados de la naturaleza, es posible delimitar el espacio 
de incertidumbre y, con ello, efectuar un análisis de costos-beneficios. Los autores 
presentan este método, que consiste en combinar el análisis de las incertidumbres 
dependientes de un determinado estado de cosas (state-contingent analysis) y 
el análisis de la relación costo-beneficio. También se detienen a examinar las 
características económicas de los sucesos de emergencia y el tipo de amenazas 
que pesan sobre los sistemas de sanidad animal. 
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